A NEW AXIS OF AMBITION: ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF A PAKISTAN–BANGLADESH DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR TREATY

Abstract

The political rupture of August 2024, marked by the collapse of Bangladesh's Awami League government, has fundamentally reconfigured the country's strategic orientation, compelling Dhaka to abandon its long-standing India-centric hedging posture in favor of hard balancing. This paper examines the feasibility and strategic implications of a formal defense and nuclear cooperation treaty between Bangladesh and Pakistan in the context of this post-2024 geopolitical realignment. Drawing on realism, balance-of-power theory, alliance theory, Regional Security Complex Theory, and strategic hedging, the study assesses the structural drivers propelling both states toward strategic convergence, including shared threat perceptions, doctrinal alignment, and the emerging China–Pakistan–Bangladesh triangle. It systematically evaluates the legal barriers imposed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA safeguards regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, and Bangladesh's own constitutional commitments to non-alignment. The paper further interrogates obstacles rooted in the historical grievances of 1971 and anticipated Indian countermeasures. Concluding that a binding NATO-style treaty remains presently unfeasible, the study proposes a Pakistan–Bangladesh Strategic Security Forum as a pragmatic, non-binding institutional alternative capable of institutionalizing defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and peaceful nuclear collaboration without triggering prohibitive legal and geopolitical costs.